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Abstract: The Embedded Firm 
This paper constitutes the introduction to an edited collection, THE EMBEDDED FIRM: 
LABOR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE CAPITALISM (Cambridge University Press, 
2011). This book brings together contributions from law, economics, sociology and politics in 
order to evaluate the effects of the shift to shareholder primacy in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom, in the context of an increasingly financialized economy. Contributors include 
Ruth Aguilera, William Allen, Harry Arthurs, Blanaid Clark, Mary Condon, Simon Deakin, 
Sandy Jacoby, William Lazonick, Sue Konzelmann, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Larry Mitchell, Frank 
Wilkinson, and the editors Cynthia Williams and Peer Zumbansen, among others. The book 
emphasizes empirical evidence, in conjunction with theory, in conscious rejection of the oft-
stated view that “it takes a theory to beat a theory.” For in evaluating the empirical effects of 
these decades-long trends, in light of the on-going global financial and economic crises—crises 
propagated from the United States--the problems inherent in American-style corporate 
governance have become manifest. Such problems do not only concern corporate governance, 
since the shareholder wealth maximizing norm in the United States is embedded within 
economic and political institutions stripped of many social democratic norms and policies and 
with an increasing tendency towards deregulation. But the book demonstrates that the result of 
shareholder primacy, in conjunction with neo-liberal economic and political norms, has been 
increasing economic volatility and inequality, systemic fragility, and financial risk that is 
increasingly being transferred to individuals to manage, given the collapse of many collective 
bargaining agreements and collective arrangements for pensions. The congruence of theory and 
evidence suggesting weaknesses in shareholder driven corporate governance as expressed in the 
U.S. and U.K. give rise to questions of how policy and research can best be harnessed to develop 
more stable systems of corporate governance, and how these goals may best be aligned with 
government policy. Since it is naïve to think that continental European stakeholder systems, also 
under pressure, could be transplanted into the United States or the United Kingdom by legislative 
fiat, the book concludes with suggestions for research and policy development to address the 
instabilities shareholder corporate governance systems create, while still relying upon existing 
models within liberal market economies.  
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11 Introduction: corporate governance  
after the ‘end of history’: investigating 
the new ‘great transformation’
Cynthia A. Williams and Peer Zumbansen
Over the last two decades, debates over the convergence or per-
sistence of corporate governance systems have deeply engaged the 
energies of academics, regulators and investors. These debates have 
encompassed both the structural mechanisms of corporate decision-
making, examining where decision-making authority should lie 
within the company and which groups should have power, as well as 
the more politically contested issue of whose interests should matter 
when corporate decisions are being made. How companies are organ-
ized, and what powers their constituents have to in!uence the corpor-
ate enterprise – the core questions of corporate governance – in turn 
in!uence capital markets and the investment decisions of managers 
of huge pools of capital. ‘Does the country have an equity culture’ 
is often the question asked by investors and asset managers before 
massive amounts of money are shifted into, or out of, a country at the 
click of a ‘mouse’.
Debates over the convergence or persistence of corporate govern-
ance systems take place in the shadow of at least four signi"cant trends 
affecting operating companies.
First, there is increased global product market competition caused by 
improvements in information technology, transportation, standardiza-
tion and supply chain management. These pressures have forced com-
panies in every economy to cut costs, innovate, adopt new business 
strategies and develop new alliances. The intellectual habits of product 
and process innovation have also fuelled "nancial innovation towards 
similar goals: a search for yield and thus advantage.
Second, we see the transformation of the world’s largest corpora-
tions from primarily locally- or domestically-situated enterprises into 
global networks of supply chains and corporate parent/subsidiary rela-
tionships. Such enterprises, held together by webs of contracts, law 
and the interstitial glue of company history and norms, are subject to 
competing demands from far-!ung regulators, consumers, investors, 
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non-governmental organizations and professionals such as lawyers, 
investment bankers and accountants.
Third, undergirding these developments are dramatically increased 
global capital market pressures throughout the developed and devel-
oping world. Newly-engaged market participants; new institutional 
investors and large pools of investible capital; increasing numbers of 
shareholders with activist agendas; and new types of nancial innov-
ation and complex nancial engineering have accelerated the transition 
from industrial to nance capitalism in developed economies. Finance 
has come to be the dominant contributor to the economic output of 
such advanced democracies as the United States and Britain, and is 
of signi cant importance to the productive capacities of countries 
throughout the world.
Fourth, these trends are situated in a broader context, which is the 
emergence of the knowledge society, prompting a reconceptualization 
of public and private forms of governance. Both political and ‘private’ 
actors such as non-governmental organizations, corporations, collec-
tives and individuals operate under conditions of extreme uncertainty, 
both in terms of procedural and institutional design as well as norma-
tive horizon. On the one hand, governments and governmental actors 
have become increasingly dependent on fragmented, societal know-
ledge, which leads to an important recon guration of the relations 
between political and civil society actors. The state, in its dependence 
on constantly updated information, is at the same time implicated in 
the production of that very information by creating rules and facilitat-
ing institutional growth for knowledge production and dissemination. 
On the other, corporations and other societal actors face pressing gov-
ernance challenges that in many ways mirror those of contemporary 
political governing bodies. The dependence of management on expert 
knowledge, which is generated and communicated both in and outside 
of the rm, has grown in correlation with the expanding reach of busi-
ness activities and their impact. With governments and corporations 
as knowledge actors, producers and consumers, the pressure on law 
to facilitate and to enable these processes has grown exponentially. No 
longer clearly situated in an exclusively public or private sphere, ‘pol-
itical’, ‘private’, corporate actors are both authors and receivers of the 
rules that govern their behaviour.
Given these rapid changes in global operating conditions, it is under-
standable that there would be pressures on companies to adopt new 
governance mechanisms in response. Lengthening supply chains, 
emerging markets such as those in Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
China becoming part of global production, and increased competition 
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all require different managerial arrangements within the rm, at the 
least. And yet, we argue, the speci c pressures to adopt corporate 
governance systems that prioritize shareholders’ interests – pressures 
particularly salient in Europe – were as much a product of political 
ideology as changing economic requirements. In the enclosed chapters 
we examine those pressures and their effects, both within rms and 
within societies, evaluating the results of shareholder primacy in light 
of increasing nancialization not only as a matter of theory, but also as 
a matter of fact.
 Thematic overview
The following collection addresses, from a historical and comparative 
perspective, the changing regulatory landscape for business corpora-
tions and nancial institutions which has evolved in light of the increas-
ing globalization of the markets and ‘ nancialization’ of economies. 
Taking their cue from political economy studies of national varieties of 
market regulation, going back to Karl Polanyi and Andrew Shon eld, 
the contributing authors explore the effect of integrating markets 
and converging policy strategies on corporate governance, nance 
and labour market regulation. The collection brings together authors 
from law, economics, sociology and political science from both North 
America and Europe to study the evolution of corporate, nancial and 
labor regulation against the background of the continuing global eco-
nomic – and regulatory – crisis.
Inspired by Sanford Jacoby’s book The Embedded Corporation,1 and 
by institutional and political economy accounts of corporate govern-
ance complementarities, the collected chapters bring a number of dis-
ciplinary perspectives to bear to the study of the regulatory evolution 
and relationship between rms, nance and labour in the transform-
ation from industrial to nance capitalism. Part I of the book traces 
and evaluates this transformation, connecting it to the nancial crisis 
that erupted in 2007. Contributions from Simon Deakin and Larry 
Mitchell provide a theoretical and historical framework for the book 
as a whole, discussing, respectively, the shift to shareholder primacy 
and the transformation to nance capitalism in the United States 
and United Kingdom. Contributions from William Allen, former 
Chancellor of the Chancery Court in Delaware, and historian Dalia 
Tsuk Mitchell analyse some of the implications of this transformation 
 1 Sanford Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005).
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to nance capitalism on operating companies and their boards of dir-
ectors, showing the political, historical and sociological forces as work. 
Fenner Stewart locates these developments within the theoretical 
debates of leading corporate law scholars today, while Peer Zumbansen 
provides a broader framework to evaluate the challenges facing both 
companies and governments within the global knowledge society. 
Zumbansen’s chapter places Polanyi’s work on embedded capitalism in 
the current context of both an intensi ed process of Europeanization 
and a global search for regulatory remedies against the dramatic mar-
ket failures since 2007.
Part II looks more speci cally at particular amalgamations of nan-
cial power that have formed as the transformation to nance capital-
ism gathered momentum; particular (and particularly destabilizing) 
nancial instruments; and important regulatory and policy develop-
ments in Europe and within international nancial institutions such 
as the World Bank as pressures mounted to adopt more shareholder 
friendly corporate governance systems. Stephen Diamond, a contrar-
ian on the nancialization theme, nonetheless evaluates and high-
lights the growing in uence of private equity investors and hedge 
funds in the US market. Simon Archer traces changes in the compos-
ition, sources of funding and actions within the capital markets of the 
largest public pension funds in Canada, using that case study as a lens 
through which to scruitinize the economic role of public pension funds 
more generally. Janis Sarra discusses credit default swaps and ana-
lyses their destabilizing in uence on both nancial markets and bank-
ruptcy proceedings, providing speci c policy advice for regulators to 
use to address the problems these instruments have caused. Blainaid 
Clarke’s contribution discusses the highly-contested European 
Takeover Directive, in which the European stakeholder vision of the 
corporation was supplanted by shareholder-centric rights and pride 
of place. Her chapter also shows how the political compromises in 
the Takeover Directive actually operate simultaneously to resist that 
shareholder perspective. Ruth Aguilera and Cynthia Williams critic-
ally evaluate the shareholder bias of noted nance theorists, Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert 
Vishny [commonly referred to as ‘LLSV’] from the perspective of 
economic sociology, while recognizing the important in uence on 
policy LLSV’s theories have had at the World Bank. Collectively 
these authors bring a legal and political economy perspective to bear 
to carve out the implications of each of these developments for the bal-
ance of power within the rm and for the distributions of wealth and 
risk within developed economies.
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There are a number of themes that emerge as we look at the trans-
formation to nance capitalism in Parts I and II. One, which is not 
unexpected, is that within their different corporate governance struc-
tures, labour interests in Europe, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Canada have responded to the shift towards nance cap-
italism in ways characteristic of their home countries’ underlying pol-
itical theories, alliances and power relationships. Thus, labour unions 
in the United States and Canada have used their pension capital as 
shareholder activists to advance the interests of their members by using 
their shareholder voting power, seeking transparency of voting records 
by their asset managers; board accountability through changes in vot-
ing rules; and involvement in limiting executive compensation through 
the use of shareholder proxy proposals. In these activist uses of pen-
sion fund voting power, the expressed corporate governance agenda of 
labour shareholders has little differed from the corporate governance 
agenda of shareholder activists generally, including promoting changes 
in companies’ organizing documents that allow the market for corporate 
control to ourish. Indeed, in an irony little noted in the academic lit-
erature (but discussed by Jacoby in this collection), in the United States 
labour corporate governance activists have been shareholders most 
consistent advocate. In Europe, labour has used their more integrated 
political position as recognized social partners to resist efforts to dis-
mantle works councils and co-determination, but have also responded 
pragmatically in some cases, such as in Germany, as the economic 
bargains of the post-war era came under increasing pressure from the 
demands of nance capitalism. In Part III contributions from Harry 
Arthurs and Claire Mummé discuss these differing uses of labour’s 
shareholding power in North America and Europe, using a political 
economy analysis, while economist John Evans evaluates labour’s voice 
in international public policy by examining the Trade Union’s Advisory 
Council’s position within the OECD.
One of the clearest implications of the shift to nance capitalism has 
been a corollary insistence that the interests of shareholders should 
predominate in both corporate governance theory and capital market 
regulation. A second theme of the book is that the underlying premise 
asserted in favour of the shareholder model of corporate governance, 
that such a shift would enhance social welfare, has not been proven. 
American legal academics Henry Hansmann of Yale University and 
Reinier Kraakman of Harvard University have been among the most 
succinct advocates for the view that there will be (and should be) con-
vergence on the shareholder model of corporate governance, as argued 
in their iconic article from 2001, ‘The End of History for Corporate 
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Law’.2 In that article they posited that shareholder wealth maximiz-
ing views of the corporate governance relationship would ultimately 
predominate throughout the world, by virtue of ‘the force of logic, 
the force of example, and the force of competition’.3 As they put the 
argument in its strongest form, ‘[t]he point is simply that now, as a 
consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence on a 
consensus that the best means to this end – the pursuit of aggregate 
social welfare – is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to 
shareholder interests and (at least in direct terms) only to those inter-
ests’.4 Yet, the premise that shareholder capitalism enhances social 
welfare has not been seriously examined as an empirical matter by 
leading corporate law scholars in the United States. Rather, it has 
been accepted as an article of faith or has been demonstrated by virtue 
of high share prices.
In Parts III and IV the premise that shareholder capitalism enhances 
social welfare is, thus, examined empirically, and is found to be unsup-
ported by the evidence. Contributions by leading labour scholars 
Sanford Jacoby and Harry Arthurs; by industrial relations economists 
Suzanne Konzelmann and Frank Wilkinson; and by labour economists 
William Lazonick and John Evans collectively show that pride of place 
to nance is correlated with increased economic insecurity and inequal-
ity; that shareholder capitalism is inconsistent with highly-productive 
industrial relations; and that investors’ short-term demands, ltered 
through the stock market or through concentrated pools of investment 
capital, have often undermined companies’ long-term planning and 
investments in research and development to meet future strategic and 
social challenges. While the Anglo-American venture capital markets 
permit rapid innovation, the pressures of nance, within shareholder 
wealth maximizing corporate governance norms, do not produce 
 2 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ 
(2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439 (‘End of History I’). Hansmann and Kraakman 
further elaborate in a related article, also entitled ‘The End of History for Corporate 
Law’, in Jeffrey Gordon and Mark Roe (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) (‘End of History II’). It 
is signi cant that Hansmann and Kraakman reiterated their views of the superior-
ity of American-style shareholder-oriented corporate governance in that collection 
in 2004, notwithstanding the stock market bubble having burst in the United States, 
which occurred in 2001–2002, and notwithstanding the serious weaknesses of Enron, 
WorldCom and many other noted failures of corporate governance in the United Sates 
during 2001–2002.
 3 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘End of History I’, p. 441.
 4 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘End of History II’, pp. 42–43.
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 companies that show the same capacity for incremental innovation and 
learning as do European structures.5
The third theme of this book, then, engages with the debates over 
corporate governance systems. The explicit brief of many of these 
debates has been to determine whether companies are more ef cient 
and countries more economically successful by prioritizing the interests 
of shareholders within liberal market economies, rather than balancing 
the claims of a broader range of stakeholders within coordinated market 
economies, using the categories introduced by Varieties of Capitalism 
scholars.6 The implicit brief of these debates has challenged European 
countries and rms, where successful market economies are well-
 established, to adopt Anglo-American shareholder capitalism, even as 
advocates did their best to export American-style capitalism through-
out the developing world. The contribution by Frank Jan De Graaf and 
Cynthia Williams in Part IV examines the underlying ideological com-
mitments of liberal market corporate governance theory, and challenges 
Anglo-American theorists to think more carefully about the bene ts of 
European systems, both for corporate governance arrangements and 
for capital market regulation. Mary Condon’s contribution provides a 
political economy explanation for international securities regulators’ 
attempts to have greater in uence in transnational regulatory efforts 
after the global nancial crisis by strategically deploying the concept of 
‘systemic risk’, but also points out regulatory and de nitional problems 
this concept creates. She also develops the point that securities regula-
tors may need to revisit long-held understandings of the purpose and 
orientation of disclosure as the preferred regulatory strategy. Part IV 
concludes with Keith Johnson and Frank Jan De Graaf’s recommenda-
tions for how understanding of pension funds’ duciary duties must 
evolve to take account of the systemic in uence these important market 
actors now have.
 Theoretical perspectives
As a general matter, the contributors to this book suggest that what 
could seem to be politically neutral or merely technical debates about 
the best systems of corporate governance as a means to the end of 
creating ef cient, well-run companies and economically successful 
 5 Jacoby, Embedded Corporation, p. 19.
 6 Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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countries are masking, in fact, serious ideological disagreements. This 
observation should hardly be surprising, and indeed has been the basis 
for a respected analysis for why European countries have so far failed 
to create deep, liquid capital markets.7 Nor should the resistance of 
countries encompassing stakeholder governance systems towards 
Anglo-American shareholder governance systems be surprising. 
Inspired by Karl Polanyi and Mark Granovetter as well as by the more 
recent revival of economic sociology, spearheaded by scholars such as 
Richard Swedberg and Jens Beckert, we nd that two fundamental 
dynamics might well explain the persistence of corporate governance 
systems: the embedded nature of companies, corporate governance sys-
tems, and markets, as theorized by Granovetter; and the ‘double move-
ment’ of market liberalization and resistance, as theorized by Polanyi, 
who himself is regularly associated with designing a theory of embed-
ded capitalism.
In his article ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem 
of Embeddedness’,8 Mark Granovetter brought a sociological and insti-
tutional perspective to bear on a fundamental observation: that markets 
are embedded within the social and political systems in which they arise. 
Thus, markets cannot be considered free-standing institutions outside 
of a society, as the ‘free market’ often had been, and still is in some con-
texts. Rather ‘the market’ must be understood as an embedded institu-
tion that manifests the social and political values of the society in which 
it is embedded, including the professional and transnational networks 
that affect the market, even as it develops its own logic and values. One 
implication of this view is that corporate governance reforms cannot 
be considered in isolation from a thorough understanding of the social 
and cultural context in which companies arise, and in conjunction with 
a thorough understanding of the complementarities between compan-
ies, corporate governance systems, and the political and institutional 
frameworks in which companies operate. Since stakeholder corporate 
governance systems are consistent with the social democratic traditions 
in the countries in which they’ve arisen – primarily in Northern and 
Central Europe, but also to some extent in Japan – it would be naïve 
to expect they would converge to Anglo-American shareholder capit-
alism smoothly. Even in the face of global product market competition 
and institutional investor pressure that will in theory privilege the most 
 7 Mark Roe, ‘Modern Politics and Ownership Separation’, in Gordon and Roe, 
Convergence and Persistence, pp. 252–290.
 8 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness’ (1985) 91 American Journal of Sociology 481–510.
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ef cient system of corporate organization9 – believed by many American 
law professors to be theirs10 – one would expect exactly the persistence 
of stakeholder systems that is observed, albeit under pressure.
Indeed, Karl Polanyi’s work from 1944 on the double movement of 
market liberalization and resistance predicts this persistence. In The 
Great Transformation Polanyi argued that as markets expand, so do their 
undesirable side-effects: instability, monopoly and negative external-
ities, for instance, and that these side-effects cannot be solved by the 
market itself. Rather, market expansions are followed by social resist-
ance to ‘the pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy’. Polanyi 
called this the double movement: ‘[T]he action of two organizing prin-
ciples in society … economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of 
a self-regulating market … [and] the other was the principle of social 
protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as pro-
ductive organization.’11
The theme of the ‘embedded rm’ that lies at the core of this vol-
ume thus reaches back to a signi cant return of economic sociology since 
the 1980s, notably inspired by Granovetter’s seminal article.12 The sig-
ni cance of this reorientation in research lies in its distinct interdisci-
plinarity. In contrast to the rise in importance of economics in various 
elds in law, particularly tort, contract, property and corporate law,13 
the emerging eld of economic sociology brings together administra-
tive and regulatory studies in the tradition of Max Weber with schol-
arship in institutional and new institutional economics, such as that by 
Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson.14 Furthering and 
 9 A number of academics have recognized that there can be different ways to  organize 
ef cient corporate organizations, and that there can be comparative economic advan-
tage to different corporate governance systems. Jacoby, Embedded Corporation, pp. 
170–171: ‘The Japanese corporate system – governance, strategy, HR, and much 
besides – facilitates organizational learning and allows companies to specialize in 
products and processes that are dif cult for other companies to imitate. By contrast, 
the U.S. emphases on exibility and mobility require general, not rm-speci c, skills 
to facilitate rapid allocation of resources to emergent industries.’ Jeffrey Gordon and 
Mark Roe, ‘Introduction’, in Gordon and Roe, Convergence and Persistence, p. 5 (rec-
ognizing the possibility of various paths to ef cient corporate organizations).
 10 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘End of History I’, p. 441; Hansmann and Kraakman, 
‘End of History II’, pp. 46–48.
 11 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
(New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944), p. 132.
 12 Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure’.
 13 See generally Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), 
and subsequent editions; Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics, 4th 
edn (Boston: Pearson, 2004).
 14 Richard Swedberg, ‘The Economic Sociology of Capitalism: An Introduction and 
Agenda’, in Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg (eds.), The Economic Sociology of 
Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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expanding the investigative scope of the law and economics agenda, eco-
nomic sociology has contributed to an increasingly ambitious intellectual 
discourse about how to organize, govern and regulate corporations across 
societies.15 We recognize this to be another illustration of an encompass-
ing trend towards ‘governance studies’, which often have their starting 
point within the framework of a particular discipline but which unfold in 
an inherently border-crossing manner, drawing on a wealth of different 
disciplinary perspectives, theoretical foundations and empirical data.16
Re ecting on this context, much of the scholarship on comparative cor-
porate governance has been dominated by a law and economics perspec-
tive.17 Two volumes, one edited by John Armour and Joseph McCahery,18 
and the other edited by Jeffrey Gordon and Mark Roe,19 have attracted 
considerable attention in enlarging the perspectives on the vivid debate 
over ‘convergence’ or ‘divergence’ in corporate governance principles. 
Central to all of these volumes, however, is a signi cantly biased per-
spective from which the policy and regulatory changes within differently 
observed countries are studied primarily with view to a very small set 
of established principles of economically theorized, allegedly technical 
or, ‘good’ corporate governance, including enhanced investor protec-
tion, capital markets disclosure as a primary regulatory mechanism, an 
absence of employee co-determination and a reduced interventionist role 
of the state. This credo is signi cantly captured in two landmark mono-
graphs, one by Mark Roe from 2003, and one from Kraakman et al. in 
2004, that each received both explicit praise and criticism.20
 15 Ruth V. Aguilera and Gregory Jackson, ‘International and Comparative Corporate 
Governance’ (2010) 4 Academy of M anagement Annals 485–556.
 16 Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Conundrum of Order. The Concept of Governance from an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective’, in David Levi-Faur (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 forthcoming).
 17 See here, above all the following volumes: Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark Roe, 
Eddy Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance. The 
State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998); Klaus Gugler (ed.), Corporate Governance and Economic Performance 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Joseph A. McCahery, Piet 
Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers and Luc Renneboog (eds.), Corporate Governance 
Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002); Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Capital M arkets and Company Law 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Klaus J. Hopt et al. (eds.), 
Corporate Governance in Context. Corporations, States and M arkets in Europe, Japan and 
the US (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
 18 John Armour and Joseph McCahery (eds.), After Enron. Improving Corporate Law and 
M odernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US (Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2006).
 19 Gordon and Roe, Convergence and Persistence.
 20 Mark Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); evaluated in Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Politics 
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At the same time, the economic sociology camp has been extremely 
proli c: led by thinkers such as Wolfgang Streeck at the Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany,21 and by com-
parative political economists such as Peter Hall and David Soskice, this 
eld has produced an impressive number of critiques of the ‘conver-
gence advocates’, convincingly arguing for a more layered perspective 
on the different dynamics of institutional change with regard to path-
dependent, historically evolved corporate governance regimes.22 This 
work has been published in the intellectually rich context of a renewed 
interest in the ‘embeddedness of market institutions’, as originally 
spearheaded by Karl Polanyi,23 revived by Granovetter (1985),24 before 
receiving more attention from sociologists and political economists in 
a volume edited by Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer25 as well 
as by scholars such as Neil Fligstein.26 Related works in this regard 
have focused on the case of Europe in particular, providing important 
comparative insights on the different conditions of institutional change 
and regulatory responses in countries adapting to globally integrated 
markets, for goods, services, capital and people.27
Our collection brings together a diverse group of contributors to 
challenge the premises of the law and economics perspective with the 
insights of labour law scholars, economic sociologists and stakeholder 
of Corporate Governance Regulation’ (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1829–1880; 
Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, 
Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); dis-
cussed in David A. Skeel Jr., ‘Corporate Anatomy Lessons’ (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 1519–1577.
 21 Wolfgang Streeck, Reforming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political 
Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
 22 Wolfgang Streeck, ‘German Capitalism: Does It Exist? Can It Survive?’, in Colin 
Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism 
(London: Sage, 1997); Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura (eds.), The Origins 
of Nonliberal Capitalism in Germany and Japan: Cornell Studies in Political Economy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism.
 23 Polanyi, The Great Transformation.
 24 See also Mark Granovetter, ‘The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes’ 
(2005) 19 Journal of Economic Perspectives 33–50.
 25 J. Rogers Hollingsworth, ‘Continuities and Changes in the Social Systems of 
Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany, and the United States’, in J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer (eds.), Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness 
of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
 26 Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets. An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First 
Century Capitalist Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
 27 Steven Weber (ed.), Globalization and the European Political Economy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Jonathan Zeitlin and David Trubek (eds.), 
Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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governance experts. Building on the past twenty- ve years of intensive 
research in the noted elds, the contributors to this volume integrate 
work done in comparative law, new institutional economics, compara-
tive political economy, regulatory theory, economic sociology and 
social norms theory in a serious manner. There is no question for these 
authors that the regulatory landscape of corporate and nancial regu-
lation has changed dramatically in an era of post-welfare state market 
intervention, marked by indirect regulation, soft law and delegation on 
the one hand and a dramatically integrated global market on the other. 
Yet the current challenges of the global nancial crisis give pause, and 
call for a re-examination of the premises upon which capital market 
deregulation and the shareholder primacy viewpoint were based.
In this volume, the contributing authors engage with the concept 
of ‘embeddedness’ in a context, where the mainstream view – until 
very recently – sternly defended the demise of effective governmental 
interventions into market relations. At the present time, the renewed 
interest in political economy, and the varied histories of regulation and 
the notion of embedded institutions, re ects on a wide-reaching aware-
ness of the importance of reassessing the foundations of institutional 
change.
 Conclusion
Written as the nancial and economic crises since 2007 continue to 
destabilize economies around the world, the social vulnerabilities that 
have been created by the shift in corporate priorities over the past 
three decades to short-term shareholders’ interests are tragically evi-
dent. What is less evident is the way forward, from both a theoretical 
and policy perspective. Studying the trajectory of the past, in careful 
detail; developing an analysis of the pressures of nance capitalism and 
implications of those pressures; and examining views of the rm with a 
broader perspective on the interests to be considered, while attending 
to the conditions necessary for institutional learning, is the task we’ve 
set for ourselves. We bring together the enclosed chapters to challenge, 
to inspire discussion, and to suggest ideas for that way forward, a way 
that we suggest must better accommodate broader societal interests 
within the nancial Prometheus that concentrated capital and nancial 
innovation have unbound.
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H istorical trajectories of business  
and regulation
 
 
477
21 Conclusion: evaluation, policy  
proposals and research agenda
Cynthia A. Williams and Peer Zumbansen
In this book we’ve brought together contributions from law, econom-
ics, sociology and politics in order to evaluate the effects of the shift 
to shareholder primacy in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, in the context of a parallel shift in both countries to an econ-
omy in which nance has an increasingly central role. We have made 
a decision to include and even emphasize empirical evidence, rather 
than theory alone, in conscious rejection of the oft-stated view that 
“it takes a theory to beat a theory.” For in evaluating the empirical 
effects of these decades-long trends in light of the global nancial and 
economic crises – crises propagated from the United States – we sub-
mit that the problems inherent in American-style corporate governance 
have become manifest. The problem is not only one of corporate gov-
ernance, since the shareholder wealth maximizing norm in the United 
States is embedded within economic and political institutions stripped 
of many social democratic norms and policies. But in conjunction with 
neoliberal economic and political norms, the result of shareholder pri-
macy has been increasing economic volatility and inequality, systemic 
fragility and nancial risk that is increasingly being transferred to indi-
viduals to manage, particularly given the collapse of many collective 
bargaining agreements and collective arrangements for pensions.
The congruence of theory and evidence suggesting weaknesses in 
shareholder driven corporate governance gives rise to questions about 
what, instead, the goals of corporate governance should be, and how 
these goals may best be aligned with government policy. It is naïve to 
think that continental European stakeholder systems could be trans-
planted into the United States or the United Kingdom by legislative 
at. As the convergence debate has shown, corporate governance sys-
tems are sticky, being deeply embedded in complementary institutional 
frameworks, political constellations and social norms. Certainly aspects 
of stakeholder arrangements ought to be studied seriously and mined 
for their inherent values or regulatory approaches that could inform 
speci c policy recommendations. But the embedded nature of rms 
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and corporate governance arrangements does suggest caution, and 
encourages ever more serious, open-minded study in search of policy 
ideas. T he following paragraphs seek to provide some ideas about what 
topics seem worthy of that further research.
First, as emphasized in a number of chapters, there are examples 
of both economically liberal economies such as Australia and Canada, 
and coordinated market economies such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, that have either weathered the 
global nancial crisis relatively unscathed, or have shown better eco-
nomic performance than the United States and the United K ingdom 
over the last decades. (Chapter 13 is particularly instructive on these 
points, but see also Chapters 12 and 18.) Scandinavian corporate gov-
ernance systems, as such, are worthy of greater study, having been rela-
t ively ignored in many comparative or international evaluations. M ore 
generally, evidence-based comparative study of the combinations of 
corporate governance, government policy and social norms to which 
these successes are owed would no doubt yield important insights.
One promising approach to developing corporate governance think-
ing that builds on the Varieties of Capitalism intellectual tradit ion 
is to more closely examine varieties of liberalism, as has been done 
recently by K onzelmann, Fovargue-Davies and Schnyder.1 T heir paper 
addresses the question of why Australian and Canadian banks fared so 
much better in the global nancial crisis than did American and Brit ish 
banks, even though all four countries share an English common-law 
heritage and are market oriented economies. I n addit ion to various 
government policies that did not permit imprudent mortgage lending 
or excessive leverage within nancial institutions, the authors point to 
variations among the type of economic liberalism informing policy gen-
erally in Australia and Canada versus the United States and the United 
K ingdom. T hey construe Australian and Canadian economic policy 
as a variation of “ ordoliberalism,”  an approach to economic regulation 
developed by the German Freiburg school of economists in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. T his school of thought encourages a 
more active role for government than does laissez-faire liberalism, par-
t icularly with respect to inequalit ies or abuses of power among market 
actors. Not only is this economic theory worth further exploration and 
development and has, thus, been attracting attention well beyond the 
longstanding efforts to conceptualize European legal harmonization, 
 1 S. K onzelmann, M . Fovargue-Davies and G. Schnyder, “ Variet ies of L iberalism”  
(2010), Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 
403, available at”  www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP403.pdf.
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but the concept of “ varieties of liberalism”  is an important one for iden-
tifying further research trajectories, even as the speci cs of banking 
(and pension) regulation in Canada and Australia are worthy of further 
examination.
Second, several of the market developments exposed in the nancial 
crisis and discussed in this book give rise to further research questions 
and need for policy development. One, certainly, is the “ systemic risk”  
concern identi ed in Chapter 19, particularly in conjunction with the 
derivatives market discussed by Sarra in Chapter 10. Various domestic 
regulators and transnational regulatory bodies have been grappling with 
the implications of this challenge, giving rise to a series of questions. 
“ What is systemic risk? How is it created? How can it be addressed?”  is 
just the beginning of questions that need attention. M ore fundamen-
tal, we need to ask whether we have reached a level of nancial com-
plexity that is excessive, that is beyond the capacity of nancial market 
participants themselves or regulators to understand and regulate. Is it 
simply a matter of distributed knowledge that needs to be mined more 
effectively by global regulatory “ colleges”  using better computers, or 
is there a limit to the types and number of derivative transactions that 
can be managed effectively in a world of hyper-connectivity and hyper-
speed?
Research on systemic risk illustrates the intricate nature of this cat-
egory of risk, something which is increasingly re ected, on the one 
hand, in interdisciplinary investigations on the constituting elements 
that make up systemic risk and, on the other, in an earnest revival of 
polit ical economy and economic sociology work, as indicated in our 
introduction to this collection. A de ning trait of this development is 
the distinct recognit ion that a better understanding of systemic risk is 
going to depend in a crucial manner on conceiving of it as a matter of 
comprehensive social theory, e.g. “ governance,”  rather than through 
this or that economistic “ model.”  Seen through this lens, the atten-
tion attracted by “ systemic risk”  is ample evidence of a decisive turn to 
social theory, conducted in an interdisciplinary manner.
M eanwhile, the crucial role of transparency and of “ governance 
by disclosure”  is increasingly seen as central to present debates over 
“ good”  corporate governance. T his is nowhere felt more strongly than 
in the eld of securit ies regulation, an area that in many liberal econ-
omies has relied primarily on disclosure of rm-speci c information 
as the regulatory approach, connecting to views of well-informed, 
individual rational actors making economically intelligent investment 
decisions, with the assumption that this is the best way to promote 
allocational ef ciency. Each of these premises is open to question in 
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a world of systemic complexity and multiple redistributions of risk. As 
discussed in a number of chapters (and even by some regulators),2 the 
premises of market ef ciency, individual rationality leading to market 
rationality, allocational ef ciency through capital markets, liquidity as 
always bene cial, even the role of capital markets as “ capital providers 
to rms,”  need to be re-examined in light of the global nancial crisis 
and empirical evidence of growing economic fragility, not resilience, in 
the nancial system. Systems theory and chaos theory from engineer-
ing and physics are start ing to be deployed to address these questions, 
which is a promising development. M ore fundamental and comprehen-
sive research into systemic risk, derivatives transactions and complexity 
is still necessary, however, not only from these scienti c tradit ions but 
also from cognit ive psychology and regulatory theory.
Chapters 13, 15 and 18 also point to another complex of market devel-
opments that needs further research and more sustained policy devel-
opment, and concerns the implications from trends over the last three 
decades toward the ever spiraling upward distribution of compensation 
within the rm, particularly within shareholder driven corporate gov-
ernance systems. Executive compensation systems designed to “ align 
the interests of managers with the shareholders”  as one or even the 
preferred solution to principal/agent problems, have exacerbated those 
problems, particularly, as we’ve seen, within nancial rms. Excessive 
stock option compensation and bonus-driven compensation have been 
particularly pernicious in encouraging one-way bets in management’s 
favor and excessive rm-level risk – risk that feeds into the systemic 
risk issues discussed above. As recognized by Roger M artin, the Dean 
of the Rotman School of M anagement in Toronto, Canada, executive 
compensation needs to be fundamentally re-designed to actually align 
the interests of management with that of the rm and its pro tability or 
revenue, not its stock price.3 L azonick’s work with Glimstedt and X ie 
on Swedish compensation systems provides another promising area of 
comparative study,4 and there are no doubt other comparators valuable 
for study and to inform more subtle, and effective, policy interventions 
regarding executive compensation.
 2 T he Turner Review of 2009, “A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis,”  
Financial Services Authority (United K ingdom), sect ion 1.4, available at: www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
 3 Roger M art in, “ M anagers M ust Be Judged On T he Real Score,”  Financial Times, M ay 
11, 2009, p. 9.
 4 Henrik Glimstedt, Will iam L azonick and H ao X ie, “ T he Evolut ion and Allocation of 
Employee Stock Options: Adapting US-style Compensation to the Swedish Business 
M odel”  (2006) 3 European M anagement Review 156–176.
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Much of the above seems in our view to point directly to the rm as 
an entity, the organization and nature of which clearly exceeds its char-
acterization as primarily an investment vehicle. The dramatic regula-
tory failure of corporate behavior which led to the crisis testi es to the 
inadequacy of the dominant descriptions of the rm. As alluded to in 
the introduction and spelled out in more detail in Chapter 7, there is 
much to be said for an approach which places the rm in the context of 
a volatile knowledge society, in which the demarcations between “pub-
lic” and “private” have become porous and regulatory programs are 
faced increasingly with the challenge of dealing with constellations of 
extreme uncertainty. Such uncertainty pertains to the design of organ-
izational frameworks as much as to nding the correct balance between 
interventionist and facilitative regulation. Uncertainty also pertains 
to the normative uncertainty of what rms should be allowed to do 
in a context where large portions of formerly “public” service provi-
sion, infrastructure development, nance and maintenance, as well 
as research and development, have been shifted over to the “private” 
sector. In this context of transformed statehood,5 we need to rethink 
the fundamentals of our approaches to delineating public from private 
activity.6
Parallel and partially complementing work by scholars such as 
Lazonick, O’Sullivan or Zumbansen on the “learning” or the “innova-
tive” rm, scholars such as Simon Deakin, Suzanne Konzelmann, 
Sanford Jacoby, Harry Arthurs but also Paddy Ireland and John 
Parkinson have been investigating, in particular, the role of the employee 
within the rm. Today, the disciplinary horizon has been widened even 
further. As employees within rms increasingly become critical to rms’ 
knowledge bearing and knowledge creating capacities, insights from 
industrial and organizational psychology need to be brought to bear to 
connect those important disciplines’ research with corporate govern-
ance and employment compensation design. Industrial and organiza-
tional psychology mechanisms to create high performance workplaces 
and enhance the justice climates within rms are well-understood in 
those disciplines, and the productivity gains of various mechanisms 
supported by extensive empirical evidence from both eld and labora-
tory studies. This knowledge has been poorly integrated into corporate 
governance thinking on executive compensation, however, and as such 
provides fertile ground for interdisciplinary advance.
 5 See the interdisciplinary research program at www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de.
 6 For an early, provocative approach, see Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 
or Private Vices, Public Bene ts (1714).
 
 
C.A. Williams and P. Zumbansen482
Finally, the capital market interventions of pension funds, and the 
duciary duties of pension fund trustees, need further research and 
careful policy consideration given the importance of these collective 
welfare institutions to the health of both societies and capital markets. 
As Chapters 9, 13 and 20 explore, pension funds of various kinds (pub-
lic, private and/or labor-oriented) have become key market actors, own-
ing large swathes of the market and becoming invested in every asset 
class and type of nancial transaction. Given their long-term promises 
to bene ciaries they ought to be the ult imate patient capitalists. Decades 
of under-funding by polit ical actors have created acute short-term pres-
sures, however. M oreover, pension funds interact with an entire supply 
chain of advisors and asset managers whose incentives may not, and 
often do not, align with the interests of the ult imate bene ciaries. T hus 
many funds have become anything but patient capitalists. How this 
situation could be addressed requires a fundamental re-evaluation of 
the nature of funds’ duciary duties, recognizing that funds own the 
whole market and thus need to be concerned with the health of the 
whole market and the societies in which they are embedded. M oreover 
the problems associated with the funds’ investment supply chain are 
well understood, as Chapter 20 discusses. I t is t ime to consider in more 
detail policy solutions to address those problems. As with each of the 
topics discussed here, the present collection suggests that such solu-
t ions ought to be pursued through a close dialogue between “ theory”  
and “ practice.”
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In this book we’ve brought together contributions from law, econom-
ics, sociology and politics in order to evaluate the effects of the shift 
to shareholder primacy in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, in the context of a parallel shift in both countries to an econ-
omy in which !nance has an increasingly central role. We have made 
a decision to include and even emphasize empirical evidence, rather 
than theory alone, in conscious rejection of the oft-stated view that 
“it takes a theory to beat a theory.” For in evaluating the empirical 
effects of these decades-long trends in light of the global !nancial and 
economic crises – crises propagated from the United States – we sub-
mit that the problems inherent in American-style corporate governance 
have become manifest. The problem is not only one of corporate gov-
ernance, since the shareholder wealth maximizing norm in the United 
States is embedded within economic and political institutions stripped 
of many social democratic norms and policies. But in conjunction with 
neoliberal economic and political norms, the result of shareholder pri-
macy has been increasing economic volatility and inequality, systemic 
fragility and !nancial risk that is increasingly being transferred to indi-
viduals to manage, particularly given the collapse of many collective 
bargaining agreements and collective arrangements for pensions.
The congruence of theory and evidence suggesting weaknesses in 
shareholder driven corporate governance gives rise to questions about 
what, instead, the goals of corporate governance should be, and how 
these goals may best be aligned with government policy. It is naïve to 
think that continental European stakeholder systems could be trans-
planted into the United States or the United Kingdom by legislative 
!at. As the convergence debate has shown, corporate governance sys-
tems are sticky, being deeply embedded in complementary institutional 
frameworks, political constellations and social norms. Certainly aspects 
of stakeholder arrangements ought to be studied seriously and mined 
for their inherent values or regulatory approaches that could inform 
speci!c policy recommendations. But the embedded nature of !rms 
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and corporate governance arrangements does suggest caution, and 
encourages ever more serious, open-minded study in search of policy 
ideas. The following paragraphs seek to provide some ideas about what 
topics seem worthy of that further research.
First, as emphasized in a number of chapters, there are examples 
of both economically liberal economies such as Australia and Canada, 
and coordinated market economies such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, that have either weathered the 
global nancial crisis relatively unscathed, or have shown better eco-
nomic performance than the United States and the United Kingdom 
over the last decades. (Chapter 13 is particularly instructive on these 
points, but see also Chapters 12 and 18.) Scandinavian corporate gov-
ernance systems, as such, are worthy of greater study, having been rela-
tively ignored in many comparative or international evaluations. More 
generally, evidence-based comparative study of the combinations of 
corporate governance, government policy and social norms to which 
these successes are owed would no doubt yield important insights.
One promising approach to developing corporate governance think-
ing that builds on the Varieties of Capitalism intellectual tradition 
is to more closely examine varieties of liberalism, as has been done 
recently by Konzelmann, Fovargue-Davies and Schnyder.1 Their paper 
addresses the question of why Australian and Canadian banks fared so 
much better in the global nancial crisis than did American and British 
banks, even though all four countries share an English common-law 
heritage and are market oriented economies. In addition to various 
government policies that did not permit imprudent mortgage lending 
or excessive leverage within nancial institutions, the authors point to 
variations among the type of economic liberalism informing policy gen-
erally in Australia and Canada versus the United States and the United 
Kingdom. They construe Australian and Canadian economic policy 
as a variation of “ordoliberalism,” an approach to economic regulation 
developed by the German Freiburg school of economists in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. This school of thought encourages a 
more active role for government than does laissez-faire liberalism, par-
ticularly with respect to inequalities or abuses of power among market 
actors. Not only is this economic theory worth further exploration and 
development and has, thus, been attracting attention well beyond the 
longstanding efforts to conceptualize European legal harmonization, 
 1 S. Konzelmann, M. Fovargue-Davies and G. Schnyder, “Varieties of Liberalism” 
(2010), Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 
403, available at” www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP403.pdf.
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but the concept of “varieties of liberalism” is an important one for iden-
tifying further research trajectories, even as the speci!cs of banking 
(and pension) regulation in Canada and Australia are worthy of further 
examination.
Second, several of the market developments exposed in the !nancial 
crisis and discussed in this book give rise to further research questions 
and need for policy development. One, certainly, is the “systemic risk” 
concern identi!ed in Chapter 19, particularly in conjunction with the 
derivatives market discussed by Sarra in Chapter 10. Various domestic 
regulators and transnational regulatory bodies have been grappling with 
the implications of this challenge, giving rise to a series of questions. 
“What is systemic risk? How is it created? How can it be addressed?” is 
just the beginning of questions that need attention. More fundamen-
tal, we need to ask whether we have reached a level of !nancial com-
plexity that is excessive, that is beyond the capacity of !nancial market 
participants themselves or regulators to understand and regulate. Is it 
simply a matter of distributed knowledge that needs to be mined more 
effectively by global regulatory “colleges” using better computers, or 
is there a limit to the types and number of derivative transactions that 
can be managed effectively in a world of hyper-connectivity and hyper-
speed?
Research on systemic risk illustrates the intricate nature of this cat-
egory of risk, something which is increasingly re"ected, on the one 
hand, in interdisciplinary investigations on the constituting elements 
that make up systemic risk and, on the other, in an earnest revival of 
political economy and economic sociology work, as indicated in our 
introduction to this collection. A de!ning trait of this development is 
the distinct recognition that a better understanding of systemic risk is 
going to depend in a crucial manner on conceiving of it as a matter of 
comprehensive social theory, e.g. “governance,” rather than through 
this or that economistic “model.” Seen through this lens, the atten-
tion attracted by “systemic risk” is ample evidence of a decisive turn to 
social theory, conducted in an interdisciplinary manner.
Meanwhile, the crucial role of transparency and of “governance 
by disclosure” is increasingly seen as central to present debates over 
“good” corporate governance. This is nowhere felt more strongly than 
in the !eld of securities regulation, an area that in many liberal econ-
omies has relied primarily on disclosure of !rm-speci!c information 
as the regulatory approach, connecting to views of well-informed, 
individual rational actors making economically intelligent investment 
decisions, with the assumption that this is the best way to promote 
allocational ef!ciency. Each of these premises is open to question in 
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a world of systemic complexity and multiple redistributions of risk. As 
discussed in a number of chapters (and even by some regulators),2 the 
premises of market ef!ciency, individual rationality leading to market 
rationality, allocational ef!ciency through capital markets, liquidity as 
always bene!cial, even the role of capital markets as “capital providers 
to !rms,” need to be re-examined in light of the global !nancial crisis 
and empirical evidence of growing economic fragility, not resilience, in 
the !nancial system. Systems theory and chaos theory from engineer-
ing and physics are starting to be deployed to address these questions, 
which is a promising development. More fundamental and comprehen-
sive research into systemic risk, derivatives transactions and complexity 
is still necessary, however, not only from these scienti!c traditions but 
also from cognitive psychology and regulatory theory.
Chapters 13, 15 and 18 also point to another complex of market devel-
opments that needs further research and more sustained policy devel-
opment, and concerns the implications from trends over the last three 
decades toward the ever spiraling upward distribution of compensation 
within the !rm, particularly within shareholder driven corporate gov-
ernance systems. Executive compensation systems designed to “align 
the interests of managers with the shareholders” as one or even the 
preferred solution to principal/agent problems, have exacerbated those 
problems, particularly, as we’ve seen, within !nancial !rms. Excessive 
stock option compensation and bonus-driven compensation have been 
particularly pernicious in encouraging one-way bets in management’s 
favor and excessive !rm-level risk – risk that feeds into the systemic 
risk issues discussed above. As recognized by Roger Martin, the Dean 
of the Rotman School of Management in Toronto, Canada, executive 
compensation needs to be fundamentally re-designed to actually align 
the interests of management with that of the !rm and its pro!tability or 
revenue, not its stock price.3 Lazonick’s work with Glimstedt and Xie 
on Swedish compensation systems provides another promising area of 
comparative study,4 and there are no doubt other comparators valuable 
for study and to inform more subtle, and effective, policy interventions 
regarding executive compensation.
 2 The Turner Review of 2009, “A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis,” 
Financial Services Authority (United Kingdom), section 1.4, available at: www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
 3 Roger Martin, “Managers Must Be Judged On The Real Score,” Financial Times, May 
11, 2009, p. 9.
 4 Henrik Glimstedt, William Lazonick and Hao Xie, “The Evolution and Allocation of 
Employee Stock Options: Adapting US-style Compensation to the Swedish Business 
Model” (2006) 3 European Management Review 156–176.
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Much of the above seems in our view to point directly to the rm as 
an entity, the organization and nature of which clearly exceeds its char-
acterization as primarily an investment vehicle. The dramatic regula-
tory failure of corporate behavior which led to the crisis testi es to the 
inadequacy of the dominant descriptions of the rm. As alluded to in 
the introduction and spelled out in more detail in Chapter 7, there is 
much to be said for an approach which places the rm in the context of 
a volatile knowledge society, in which the demarcations between “pub-
lic” and “private” have become porous and regulatory programs are 
faced increasingly with the challenge of dealing with constellations of 
extreme uncertainty. Such uncertainty pertains to the design of organ-
izational frameworks as much as to nding the correct balance between 
interventionist and facilitative regulation. Uncertainty also pertains 
to the normative uncertainty of what rms should be allowed to do 
in a context where large portions of formerly “public” service provi-
sion, infrastructure development, nance and maintenance, as well 
as research and development, have been shifted over to the “private” 
sector. In this context of transformed statehood,5 we need to rethink 
the fundamentals of our approaches to delineating public from private 
activity.6
Parallel and partially complementing work by scholars such as 
Lazonick, O’Sullivan or Zumbansen on the “learning” or the “innova-
tive” rm, scholars such as Simon Deakin, Suzanne Konzelmann, 
Sanford Jacoby, Harry Arthurs but also Paddy Ireland and John 
Parkinson have been investigating, in particular, the role of the employee 
within the rm. Today, the disciplinary horizon has been widened even 
further. As employees within rms increasingly become critical to rms’ 
knowledge bearing and knowledge creating capacities, insights from 
industrial and organizational psychology need to be brought to bear to 
connect those important disciplines’ research with corporate govern-
ance and employment compensation design. Industrial and organiza-
tional psychology mechanisms to create high performance workplaces 
and enhance the justice climates within rms are well-understood in 
those disciplines, and the productivity gains of various mechanisms 
supported by extensive empirical evidence from both eld and labora-
tory studies. This knowledge has been poorly integrated into corporate 
governance thinking on executive compensation, however, and as such 
provides fertile ground for interdisciplinary advance.
 5 See the interdisciplinary research program at www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de.
 6 For an early, provocative approach, see Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 
or Private Vices, Public Bene ts (1714).
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Finally, the capital market interventions of pension funds, and the 
duciary duties of pension fund trustees, need further research and 
careful policy consideration given the importance of these collective 
welfare institutions to the health of both societies and capital markets. 
As Chapters 9, 13 and 20 explore, pension funds of various kinds (pub-
lic, private and/or labor-oriented) have become key market actors, own-
ing large swathes of the market and becoming invested in every asset 
class and type of nancial transaction. Given their long-term promises 
to bene ciaries they ought to be the ultimate patient capitalists. Decades 
of under-funding by political actors have created acute short-term pres-
sures, however. Moreover, pension funds interact with an entire supply 
chain of advisors and asset managers whose incentives may not, and 
often do not, align with the interests of the ultimate bene ciaries. Thus 
many funds have become anything but patient capitalists. How this 
situation could be addressed requires a fundamental re-evaluation of 
the nature of funds’ duciary duties, recognizing that funds own the 
whole market and thus need to be concerned with the health of the 
whole market and the societies in which they are embedded. Moreover 
the problems associated with the funds’ investment supply chain are 
well understood, as Chapter 20 discusses. It is time to consider in more 
detail policy solutions to address those problems. As with each of the 
topics discussed here, the present collection suggests that such solu-
tions ought to be pursued through a close dialogue between “theory” 
and “practice.”
